"no further steps can be taken by Her Majesty's Government with that of Nr. 7864. Vereinigte the United States in regard to that matter", and further that, "when this point Staaten. is cleared up, Her Majesty's Government, supposing that the Government of 29.Nov. 1881. the United States decline arbitration, will have to determine whether they should originate a proposal for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, or adopt any other course which the circumstances at the moment may seem to recommend." || It appears, however, that the proposal to abrogate the Treaty, which Lord Malmesbury reserved the right to originate, had already been communicated to the Government of the United States by Lord Napier, under instructions from Lord Clarendon. In a despatch, dated the 22nd March, 1858, Lord Napier wrote: "The Earl of Clarendon authorized me to inform General Cass, that Her Majesty's Government would not decline the consideration of a proposal for the abrogation of the Treaty by mutual concert. I have accordingly, on two occasions, informed General Cass that, if the The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty has been a source of unceasing embarrassment to this country, and Her Majesty's Government, if they should be so fortunate as to extricate themselves from the difficulties which have resulted from it, will not involve themselves, directly or indirectly, in any similar difficulties for the future." || The answer of General Cass to Lord Napier's several proposals was, briefly, to the effect that, pending the results expected from Sir William Ouseley's mission to the Central American States, the United States could not adopt the alternative of arbitration, "even if it had not been twice rejected before;" and that, if "the President does not hasten to consider now the alternative of repealing the Treaty of 1850, it is because he does not wish prematurely to anticipate the failure of Sir William Ouseley's mission, and is disposed to give a new proof to Her Majesty's Government of his sincere desire to preserve the amicable relations which now happily subsist between the two countries." (General Cass to Lord Napier, April 6, 1858.) In this posture of affairs, the Earl of Malmesbury instructed Sir William Ouseley to open direct negotiations with the Central American States, and, Staaten. Nr. 7648. on the 18th August, instructed Lord Napier to inform the Government of the Vereinigte United States of the intentions and object of Her Majesty's Government in 29.Nov. 1881. the premises. His Lordship added:--"Modification, arbitration and abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty have been flatly rejected" (the italics are my own). "Great Britain and Nicaragua are now about to treat as independent States." || I have emphasized the phrase "flatly rejected", in view of a subsequent instruction of the Earl of Malmesbury to Lord Napier, on the 8th December, 1858, wherein he said: "I think you would have done better if you had not too pointedly brought before the United States' Government the notion that the British Government might view with favour a proposal to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty." It is not difficult, in following this narrative, to discern that General Cass, though not desiring to express it, had an additional motive for declining at that particular time to propose the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. He did not desire by such proposed abrogation to indicate his willingness, that Sir William Gore-Ouseley should make Treaties with the separate States of Central America unrestrained by the clauses of the ClaytonBulwer Treaty inhibiting the extension of British power in that region. General Cass, with his accustomed caution and wisdom, clearly perceived, that for the United States to propose abrogations on the very eve of Sir William Ouseley's mission would lead to injurious inferences, and would imply conclusions which the United States was not prepared to admit. Objectionable as General Cass thought the Clayton - Bulwer Treaty, he thought it was better than giving the implied consent of this Government that Great Britain should obtain such Treaties as the force of her power might secure in Central America. The subsequent note of Lord Malmesbury not strained by an uncharitable construction-throws additional light on the subject, and confirms the wisdom of General Cass in declining to propose abrogation at that time. || And, besides, General Cass evidently desired to retain those very clauses of the ClaytonBulwer Treaty to which, in my despatch of the 19th, I propose, on the part of this Government, to adhere. I have dwelt with somewhat of detail on this particular historic episode, partly because it admirably illustrates she spirit with which both Governments have regarded the Clayton - Bulwer Treaty from the first, and partly because it had more direct bearing on the question of the guarantee of any isthmian transit than any other discussion of the time. In perusing the voluminous correspondence, unprinted, as well as that printed, and submitted at the time. to Congress and to Parliament, I am more than ever struck by the elastic character of the Clayton - Bulwer Treaty, and the admirable purpose it has served as an ultimate recourse on the part of either Government to check apprehended designs in Central America on the part of the other-although, all the while, it was frankly admitted on both sides that the engagements of the Treaty were misunderstandingly entered into, imperfectly comprehended, Vereinigte contradictorily interpreted, and mutually vexatious. I am, as I must confess, Nr. 7648. strengthened in this impression by the circumstance that, in his response to Staaten. my despatch of the 24th June last, Earl Granville takes the ground that the 29. Nov. 1881. position of Great Britain and the United States towards the projected Panama Canal is determined by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. It does not seem likely to become a subject for discussion how far the engagements of that compact in reality extend to the Isthmus of Panama, under the provisions of Article VIII thereof, in the same precise sense in which they extend to the projected Nicaraguan transit. For it will be observed, that this Article does not stretch the guarantees and restrictions of Article I over either the Tehuantepec route through Mexican territory, or the Panama route through Columbian territory. It is in terms an agreement to extend the protection of both countries, by Treaty stipulations, to those or any other practicable waterways or railways from ocean to ocean, across the isthmus, outside of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America. So far as the inchoate agreement to hereafter agree is applicable to the Panama transit, I have amply shown in my No. 270 of the 19th instant, that the obligations embraced on the part of the United States in concluding the prior Convention with the Republic of New Granada (now Columbia) in 1846 require that the United States should be freed from unequal and inequitable obligations to Great Britain under the vague and, as yet, unperfected compact of 1850. My main object in writing this instruction has been to strengthen your hands. in any discussion which may now ensue as to the benefits of the ClaytonBulwer Treaty and the mutual interest of the two countries in conserving it as the basis of a settlement of all questions between them touching Central American and Isthmian questions. It will be seen, that, from the time of its conclusion, in 1850, until the end of 1858, its provisions were thrice made the basis of a proposal to arbitrate as to their meaning; that modification and abrogation have been alike contingently considered; and that its vexatious and imperfect character has been repeatedly recognized on both sides. The present proposal of this Government is to free it from those embarrasing features, and leave it, as its framers intended it should be, a full and perfect settlement, for all time, of all possible issues between the United States and Great Britain with regard to Central America. If, in your conference with Earl Granville, it should seem necessary, you will make free use of the precedents I have cited; and should you, within the discretionary limits confided at the end of my No. 270, have given a copy thereof to his Lordship, you are equally at liberty to let him have a copy of this also, with the same explanation, that it is for your use, and not written as a formal note for communication to Her Majesty's Government. || I have, &c. James G. Blaine. Nr. 7649. britannien. Nr. 7649. - GROSSBRITANNIEN. Min. d. Ausw. an den engl. Gesandten in Washington. Die engl. Regierung hält am Clayton-Bulwer-Vertrag fest. Foreign Office, January 7, 1882. Sir, - In my despatch of the 13th ultimo I informed you, that the UniGross- ted States' Minister at this Court had communicated to me the substance of 7. Jan. 1882. a despatch which he had received from Mr. Blaine, then Secretary of State, on the subject of the Convention of the 19th April, 1850. Finding, that Mr. Lowell was authorized to give me a copy of this despatch if I wished it, I requested him to do so, and I have already forwarded to you a copy for your information. || Her Majesty's Government have given their careful consideration to the views set forth in this paper. They entirely agree in the statement made towards its conclusion as to the cordial relations so happily existing between the two countries, and as to the opportunity which this state of things affords for a frank exposition of the views held by either Government without risk of misconstruction. They have no hesitation, therefore, in proceeding to examine the grounds advanced by Mr. Blaine for desiring a modification of the Convention. || The principles upon which the whole argument of the despatch is founded are, as far as I am aware, novel in International Law. If a discussion of the subject on the abstract grounds of public right were deemed useful or opportune, it would not be difficult to quote passages from publicists of acknowledged authority in both countries in support of this opinion. But for several reasons it will be better to treat the matter from the side of the practical considerations which it involves, without, of course, being precluded from reverting at any future stage, in case of need, to its other aspect. Her Majesty's Government cannot admit, that the analogy which it is sought to draw from the conduct of Great Britain in regard to the Suez Canal is correct or justified by the facts. They have made no attempt to fortify the Island of Cyprus, or to establish it as an armed position on an important scale, though they have an undoubted right to do so. The Fortress of Gibraltar, the Island of Malta and the Military Establishment at Aden came into the possession of England at a date long anterior to the time when the Mediterranean and the Red Sea could be regarded as a military route to India. For years afterwards the whole mass of reinforcements for India was sent by way of the Cape of Good Hope. Nor has any serious addition been made to the strength of these positions since the opening of the Canal, beyond what has been a natural consequence of the improvements in military science. Although no doubt well adapted by its situation to command the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, the Island of Perim has not in any real sense been made a fortified position. The fort and garrison on the island are, in fact, sufficient only to protect the lighthouse, which has been erected Gross there for the general benefit of navigation, from possible attack by predatory Nr. 7649. Arabs. || The Navy Department of the United States must be well aware, that britannien. Her Majesty's Government have never sought to bar or even to restrict the 7. Jan. 1882. use of the Canal by the naval forces of other countries, and that even during the recent war between Russia and Turkey, when the Canal itself formed a portion of the territory of one of the belligerents, when the seat of conflict was close at hand, and when British interests might in many other respects have been nearly involved, they contented themselves with obtaining an assurance that the sphere of operations should not be extended to the Canal. Her Majesty's Government cordially concur in what is stated by Mr. Blaine as regards the unexampled development of the United States on the Pacific Coast, and the capacity which they possess for further progress. That development has been watched in this country with admiration and interest, and will continue to be so regarded. But though in rapidity it may, and probably has, exceeded the most sanguine calculation, Her Majesty's Government cannot look upon it in the light of an unexpected event, or suppose that it was not within the view of the statesmen who were parties on either side to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The declarations of President Monroe and of his Cabinet in 1823 and 24, whatever may be the view taken of their scope and bearing, and of the admissibility of the principles which they involve, or which it is sought to deduce from them, show at least that at that period-twenty-six years anterior to the Treaty now under discussion-there was a clear prevision of the great future reserved to the Pacific Coast. It is in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government an inadmissible contention, that the regular and successful operation of causes so evident at the time, and in their nature so irrepressible, should be held to have completely altered the condition of affairs to the extent of vitiating the foundations of an agreement which cannot be supposed to have been concluded without careful thought and deliberation. While recognizing to the fullest degree the extent to which the United States must feel interested in any Canal which may be constructed across the Isthmus of Panama, Her Majesty's Government would be wanting in regard to their duty if they failed to point out that Great Britain has large Colonial possessions no less than great commercial interests, which render any means of unobstructed and rapid access from the Atlantic to the North and South Pacific Oceans a matter for her also of the greatest importance. The development of these Possessions and interests has steadily continued, possibly with less rapidity, but on a scale which has some relation even to that of the Pacific States. Her Majesty's Government do not wish to ignore the share which other nations have acquired in the commerce of Central and South America, nor to exclude from consideration the interest of those countries in any Canal which may be made across the Isthmus. They are of opinion that such a Canal as the waterway between two great oceans and between all Europe and Eastern Asia is a work which concerns not merely the |