The divinity of the Holy Ghoft feems to be established in Acts, 5, 3. where Peter fays to Annanias and Sapphira, "Why hath Satan filled thine heart," &c. We might also from several paffages fhew the divine attributes given to the Spirit, as omnipotence, Pfalm 119. "Whither fhall "I go from thy Spirit," &c. Omnifcience, Cor. 2. 10. "The Spirit fearcheth all things even the deep things of God," nay creation seems to be ascribed to him as well as the Son, Gen. 1, 2. It is faid "the Spirit of God "moved upon the face of the waters," and Job 33, 4. "The fpirit of the Lord hath made me, and the breath "of the Almighty hath given me life.

There were in the ancient churches confiderable controverfies about the expreffion of the articles of faith upon this fubject. The very words of fcripture, John 15, 26. are that the Spirit proceedeth from the Father. He is also called the Spirit of the Son, and the Spirit of Chrift, Rom. 8, 9. Gal. 14, 6. Phil. 1, 14. 1 Pet. 1, 11. both the Father and the Son are faid to fend the Spirit, John 15, 26. John 16. 7. Gal. 4, 6. Luke 24, 49.

Therefore the ufual way of speaking and that in all the ancient fymbols and confeffions is, that the Son is begotten of the Father, and the Holy Ghoft proceedeth from the Father and the Son. If any one fhould prefume to enquire farther into the meaning, or afk the difference between being begotten and proceeding, I fhould willingly and chearfully confefs my ignorance, and that I believe all others are equally ignorant, and that every attempt to fay more than is actually contained in fcripture is not only impoffible but hurtful. There was a very violent difpute between the Latin and Greek churches whether it was proper to fay the Holy Ghoft proceeded from the Father and Son, or from the Father only. The whole current of antiquity, and the whole Latin churches are for the former, as well as the Proteftants in general; but it is not a modern controverfy.

I proceed to confider fome of the objections against the reasoning above, and unless I enter into the criticisms or particular texts, they may be all reduced to the reafoning on the titles and attributes. They object that fome

of the highest titles were not given to the Son, as-the higheft or moft high-the Almighty or Supreme over all one God and Father of all-one God of whom are all things. But it is eafy to answer that none of these titles are greater or more diftinguishing than, as has been fhewn, do really belong to Chrift, and that fome of those mentioned are alfo afcribed to Chrift; fuch as the Almighty, and God over all. So that they are obliged to have recourse to the meaneft quibbles, to interpret away these texts. As for the expreffion one God, and the title one God the Father of whom are all things-they are plainly ufed in a diftribution of perfonal acts or prerogatives, one God the Father, of whom are all things, and one Lord Jefus Chrift by whom are all things.

The other objection is that fuch titles are afcribed to him in a lower fenfe than to the Father. Nothing could fuggeft fuch an objection as this except the power of prejudice. They must first take for granted their own fentiments before they can perceive any fuch thing, befides many of them are fuch as do not admit of a proportion in this way-fuch as creation-omnifcience-omnipotence.

LECTURE XII.

W

Of the Decrees of God.

E have this ftrong affertion in fcripture, "canany "by fearching find out the Almighty," &c. If the nature of God has fomething in it altogether unsearchable to us, fo must also his decrees. It is certainly proper and neceffary for divines to know all that can be known on this fubject, and therefore the study of a whole life would be well beftowed on it, if it were fure of fuccefs. Yet I apprehend a caution is not unneceffary while we are entering upon it. Our

great wisdom confifts in receiving, admitting, remembering and applying whatever is clearly revealed in scripture, both with regard to the nature and government of God; at the fame time we ought to reftrain an impatient curiofity, and guard against unneceffary, inexplicable and hurtful questions on thefe fubjects. The fcriptures do not contain any thing that is unfit for us to know. If it feemed neceffary to God to reveal the univerfality of his providence and the certainty of his purpose, we ought without doubt to believe and improve it. On the other hand let us not prefume to go any farther than he hath pointed out to us the way. Whatever he hath covered with a veil it would be both rafhness and impiety to attempt to penetrate. It is therefore my defign to ftate this matter to you in as precife and fcriptural a manner as I am able, although I must neceffarily use several of the theological fyftematical phrafes, because without them the various opinions could neither be fifted nor explained.

The expreffion itself" the decrees of God" is in a great measure if not wholly technical. In the Old Teftament indeed there are several expreffions particularly relating to the frame and conftitution of nature which are tranflated in the English Bible decrees, as in the Prov. 8. 29. "When "he gave to the fea his decree," &c. and in the fecond Pfalm fpeaking of the raifing Meffiah to his throne. "I will declare the decree." In all of thefe I believe (for I have confulted moft of them) it is the fame word that is frequently or ufually tranflated-statute, and to be fure has a meaning fomewhat fimilar to that of the word used in theology, that is, it fignifies the order or purpose of God in nature and providence. In the New Teftament there is no expreffion on this fubject that has been tranflated decree, though fome of the phrases might have been fo tranflated. The expreffions in the New Teftament are council, purpose, determinate council, foreknowledge; and when it relates to the ftate of man, choosing, ordaining. predestinating. I enter upon the criticifm of the Greek words, becaufe I think it is manifeft they are not only translated well into English, but that they are mostly if not wholly of the fame import that they are ufually un

derftood to poffefs. I fhall now fhew you a fample of the Socinian criticifm on Acts 13. 48. It is faid osoi esan tetagmenoi eis zoeen aionion, which they tranflate," as many as were fet in order, or well prepared for eternal life believed." They obferve that tetagmenoi means fet in order like a disciplined army. But it is manifeft that the word here means particularly appointed and ordained. By comparing together the feveral expreffions used, the meaning that we must affign to the whole is, that the plan of Providence and grace, as well as the fyftem of nature, muft be fuppofed to be fixed and determined, and not loose and uncertain, till the event, or till one thing be afcertained or determined by another. That things are not to God as they are to us, to whom things future have no certainty or stability, but that as far back as we can carry our ideas they were known and therefore certainly ordained. Or as fome exprefs it, that every thing that comes to have a tranfient exiflence in time, had as it were an original eternal pre-existence in the divine mind. Yet after all, you fee there is fomething in the expreffion decrees or purposes which feems to take its rife only from our own fituations and imperfections.

Men are obliged to meditate, concert and digeft their plans of future conduct before they begin to act, and then it is called their purpose, refolution, or defign, as diftinct from the actual execution. From this we feem by analogy to borrow the divine decrees. Yet every thing that implies, or arifes from ignorance, uncertainty, weakness, or imperfection, must be as much as is in our power, feparated and abftracted, when we fpeak of the decrees of God.

This leads us to obferve, that it has often been remarked by divines, that we are not to confider the divine decrees, in fo far as they are acts of the divine will, as being any thing different or diftinct from the divine nature. There are fome who have used the expreffion immanent decrees, a phrase which I confefs I do not in the least degree understand the meaning of, and therefore I can nei

ther affirm nor contradict it; without doubt we are to fepa. rate every thing belonging to created weakness. We are not to suppose that God needs forethought to discover, or time to digeft his plans, or that by any act of his will he feeks information, or feeks or receives gratification from any thing without him-If by calling the decrees of God immanent acts, it is meant to deny thefe, it is fo far juft. But when it is affirmed that the acts of the divine will, are the fame with the divine nature, as if this explained the difference between divine and human volitions, this I confefs is to me quite incomprehenfible.

In what fhall be further offered on this fubject, I fhall follow this method:

1. Speak a little of the object of the divine decrees. 2. Of the order of the decrees.

3. Of the character, quality, or attributes of the decrees as given in scripture,

4. Of their uses.

I. Let us confider the object of the decrees, and of this but a little, because it will occur again where it is of moment to examine it; yet it will throw fome light upon fome parts of the doctrine, to observe,

(1.) That the objects of the divine decrees, are ftrictly and properly univerfal; fo much fo indeed, as not to admit of any exception, or fhadow of exception-all creatures, and all their actions, and all events. Let us vary it as we please, ftill it relates to every action, and every mode of the action, and every quality that can be attributed to it-whatsoever comes to pafs. The reafon of this is plain-whatever we shall think fit to fay upon the connexion or influence of one creature or thing upon another, from which all the difficulty and confufion arifes, yet every fuch thing, and that connection itself, as much as the things to which it relates, is the object to which the divine foreknowledge, and the divine purpose extended. One would think that men fhould be agreed on this point; and probably they are so, if they understood one another; all but thofe extravagant perfons, as they may well be called, who finding themfelves hard preffed by the arguments drawn from the di