Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

foreign citizens to vote in which she declared that an international plebiscite is different from an election concerned only with domestic affairs, and that therefore the customary rules should not apply. Resident foreigners not only have an interest in the questions of sovereignty, runs the Chilean reasoning, but, as neutrals, their vote would correspond to the service of a third person in arbitral procedure. For this position Chile is forced to acknowledge that she abandons all precedent and bases her claim on considerations of equity instead. As it is well known that the foreign residents would vote to continue the Chilean rule, Peru is not inclined to acknowledge the equity of the basis.

The next exchange of proposals for a protocol occurred in 1909–10. In these Chile still insisted on the propriety of allowing all foreigners, as well as Chileans and Peruvians to vote,1 demanding only the qualifications of literacy, and a residence of six months. Although conceding a mixed board, of one Chilean, one Peruvian and one representative of the foreign residents, to administer the plebiscite, she insisted that the chairman of this, as well as of all subordinate committees, should be the Chilean member. In all other matters Chile suggested that the provisions of the Billinghurst-Latorre Protocol should be followed. Peru answered by requiring that the right to vote be limited to Peruvians and Chileans of 21 years of age, who had been born in Tacna-Arica, or had resided in the territory since July 1, 1907, and who should be present and registered at the time of the vote,2 public employees and members of the army or police alone to be excluded. As for the literacy test, although Peru has such a test in her own elections, she has always insisted that in questions of so fundamental a nature as that of change of sovereignty only universal manhood suffrage is suitable. With regard to the electoral board, Peru insisted that the presidency should belong to a neutral member, appointed by a friendly Power. She further proposed arbitration on any disputed points. Chile answered the Peruvian proposals by a note of March 3,-1910, making only very minor concessions, and refusing arbitration. Twice Chile has arbitrated boundary disputes with Argentina. She has consistently

3

1 No statistics are available regarding the different groups in the disputed provinces as the Chilean census omits to give any figures for them as distinguished from the rest of the country. The total population is probably now between ten and thirteen thousand.

2 Under both the Peruvian and the Chilean law the qualifications for the electorate are citizenship, literacy and attainment of the age of 21. In Chile domestic servants are disqualified. Chile requires a year's residence before naturalization. Peru requires a still shorter period.

3 Further, since the closing of the Peruvian schools by the Chilean authorities, in 1901, the Peruvian inhabitants of the provinces have been under great disabilities in getting a schooling for their children, which should not at the same time destroy their Peruvian patriotism, a matter which, in view of the future plebiscite, was one of importance to the Peruvian inhabitants.

refused to arbitrate that with Peru, and, no doubt with it in mind, has made a point of abstaining from accepting, at least without a reservation, any and all proposals for compulsory arbitration of any such questions, both at The Hague and at the Pan American Conferences.1

In protest against the treatment of the Peruvian inhabitants of Tacna and Arica, and especially the expulsion of the parish priests who, in spite of Chilean arguments directed to the Holy See, were still under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Bishop of Arequipa, diplomatic relations were again broken by Peru, in March, 1910. In 1912 President Billinghurst, soon after his installation as President of Peru, opened the question once more. In accordance, it is said, with a previous agreement with the Chilean Government, a telegram was sent to the Chilean Government by Wenceslao Valera, Minister of Foreign Relations for Peru, proposing that the plebiscite be held in 1933, that the suffrage should be limited to natives of the provinces and to Peruvians and Chileans who should have enjoyed three years' residence, that a literacy qualification should be included, and that the presiding officer of the directing commission should be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Chile.2 Chile at once accepted the proposal, which is referred to as the Valera-Huneesis agreement, but although the negotiations were secret, it became known in Peru that exchanges surrendering two of the cardinal points of the Peruvian contention were under way and indignation on this score served to increase the popular discontent with the Billinghurst government and was a contributory cause of the revolution which followed. Relations between the two countries have never been resumed, nor have further exchanges of an official nature occurred. As a result of demonstrations in Iquique immediately after the armistice in the European war, even consular relations have been broken off. The situation is now further complicated by the renewed exodus of

1 In accepting Article 39 of the Hague Convention of 1907 for the pacific settlement of international disputes, the Chilean representative carefully excepted all questions of origin previous to the signing of the Convention. "La Délégation du Chili désire faire la déclaration suivante au nom de son Gouvernement à propos de cet article. Notre Délégation au moment de signer la Convention de 1899 pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux l'a fait sous la réserve que l'adhésion de son Gouvernement en ce que concernait l'article 17 ne comprendrait pas les litiges ou questions antérieures à la célébration de la Convention.- La Délégation du Chili croit de son devoir renouveler aujourd'hui à propos de la même disposition la réserve qu'elle a déjà faite auparavant, quoiqu'il ne soit pas strictement nécessaire en vue du caractère même de la disposition."— Déclaration, Deuxième conférence internationale de la paix, La Haye, 15 juin-18 octobre, 1907, Actes et documents, vol. 2, p. 121.

Article 39 of the Hague Convention of 1907 for the pacific settlement of international disputes, reads as follows: "La convention d'arbitrage est conclue pour des contestations déjà nées ou pour des contestations eventuelles.- Elle peut concerner tout litige ou seulement les litiges d'une catégorie déterminée.

2 Documents, post, p. 1049.

Peruvians from Tacna and Arica and by the effort of Bolivia to gain an outlet to the sea by securing the two provinces, an arrangement which certain Chilean groups regard with favor, but which is displeasing to Peru.

THE SEPARATION OF NORWAY FROM SWEDEN, 1905.

The union of Norway and Sweden, which was established by the Act of Union of August 6, 1815, and was maintained until 1905, was a voluntary personal union of two separate and equal kingdoms under one sovereign.1 The voluntary nature of the union was emphasized by the preamble of the Act of Union, entered into by the parliaments of the respective kingdoms, which declared that the union had been effected not by force of arms but by a free and voluntary resolution which could not and ought not to be maintained except by a mutual recognition of the legitimate rights of the peoples, for the support of the common throne. The equality established by the act was, however, perfect in theory only. Although each kingdom had its own parliament, army, navy, and customs system, a separate commercial flag, and, to a certain extent made separate treaties,2 the foreign relations of the two kingdoms and the diplomatic and consular services were in the hands of Sweden.

Of the several important questions regarding the mutual relations of the two kingdoms which arose in the succeeding years, the most important was that of the consular service. The demand for a separate consular service was raised in Norway in 1892. The two kingdoms, which were in many ways commercial rivals, had different commercial systems, Sweden having protection and Norway approximately free trade. In some places where consuls were maintained, Norway had no interests whatever. The injustice of this was aggravated for Norway by the fact that Norway paid 41% per cent of the expenses of the service. The matter was the subject of incessant negotiation between 1892 and 1905. Several joint committees were appointed to consider a solution, but whatever agreements were reached by them were opposed by the Swedish Ministry. The Norwegians had in 1815 desired independence, and it was not surprising that talk of separation should revive. From the beginning of its formation, in 1869, the Great National Party of the Norwegian Left had held dissolution as its cardinal tenet. The Conservatives still upheld the union, but the obstinate stand of the Swedish Government was gradually alienating their support.

1" Le Royaume de Norvège formera un Royaume libre, indépendant, indivisible et maliénable, réuni avec la Suède sous un même Roi." Act of Union, August 6, 1815, Article I. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 5, p. 1049. The Union was based on this act and not on the Treaty of Kiel of 1814.

2 The United States in 1893 signed separate extradition treaties with Norway and Sweden, the one with Sweden signed January 14 and with Norway, June 7.

The consular question finally reached a crisis in 1905. Both houses of the Norwegian Storting had in May passed a law providing for a separate consular service, hoping that the King would give his consent to the unanimous wish of the Norwegian people. This the King refused. The Norwegian Ministry thereupon resigned, and no one of the political leaders could be prevailed upon to form a new one. On June 7 the Storting was assembled to take action. The Prime Minister informed the Storting that all the members of the Government had resigned, that the King had refused to accept the resignations, and that as an alternative government could not be formed the royal power had ceased to function and the union was therefore dissolved. The Storting at once adopted this resolution, conferring on the Ministry the power hitherto belonging to the King, and voted an address to the King setting forth the reasons for the dissolution and asking permission to elect a prince of the House of Bernadotte as King of Norway.

Sweden had to face a grave problem in her answer to this decisive action. The Swedish nobility was strong, jealous of Swedish honor and proud of Sweden's former greatness. Sweden was twice as populous as Norway. As was naturally to be expected, a Swedish war party was at once formed. The situation was, however, most unfavorable to war, even in the eyes of the militarists. Norway, though small, was well prepared, while not only was the Swedish military organization in a transition state but there was the ever present fear of Russian aggression in case Sweden should turn her back on her eastern frontier. Aside from the influence of these negative forces in Sweden, the King of Sweden, Oscar II, was a sincere friend of peace, and the lower classes in Sweden were against resorting to arms. The laborers, socialists and the influential leaders of the international peace movement spoke with earnestness in behalf of a friendly settlement of the Norwegian question, and their influence was felt in the subsequent action of the Swedish Government.1

The Resolution of the Storting had at once evoked a protest from the Swedish Government against such an arbitrary dissolution and a special session of the Swedish Riksdag had been summoned to consider the matter. The desire of the Government for a peaceful settlement was set forth in the speech of the Swedish Secretary of State before the Council on June 19. Sweden, he said, would no doubt be legally justified in maintaining its position which was founded on contract, and in using force to perpetuate it; such a proceeding would, indeed, be natural in view of the precipitate action of Norway; yet such action would be inconsistent with the true interests of Sweden, for the

1 Gjerset gives a detailed account of the May Day demonstrations for "Justice for Norway" and the speeches of the Swedish statesmen and leaders of the peace movement, K. Gjerset, History of the Norwegian People, pp. 579 et seq.

great advantages which the union had held for the two countries could only be enjoyed provided their mutual relations were cordial, and certainly could not be retained by a union based on force, which would create such ill-feeling that it would constitute a source of weakness rather than of strength. The dissolution must be legal, however, and in order to settle the most vital questions concerned in the future relations of the two countries, the Riksdag should be asked to empower the Government to negotiate with the Storting.

the

such

The Riksdag, to which this proposal was submitted on June 21, at once referred the matter to a special committee, which after a month's discussion, reported on July 25. The substance of the report and the resolution taken by the Riksdag are contained in the Address to the King of July 28. Following report of the committee the Riksdag took the position that in a matter of consequence as the dissolution of the union a surer expression of the will of the Norwegian people should be obtained. It granted the authorization requested, but on condition that the negotiations should be subsequent to a vote of the people of Norway, either for a new Storting to decide the matter, or by a direct plebiscite. Should such a vote result in favor of dissolution, the Riksdag would agree to it, on condition that agreements regarding the arbitration of future disputes, a neutral zone between the two countries, pasturage for the Nomadic Swedish Lapps, commerce in transit and common waterways were made in a manner satisfactory to Sweden's interests.1 Although formal approval was not given to this decision of the Riksdag until August 8, this resolution was at once telegraphed to the Storting by command of the King. On July 27, two days after the committee's report to the Riksdag and the day before the address referred to above, the Norwegian Department of Justice had reported to the Storting that as outside of Norway there appeared to be a doubt of the strength of the popular desire for dissolution, a doubt expressed in the committee report to the Riksdag, it was of the utmost importance that a plebiscite should be held, not so much to ascertain the wish of the people, for that was sufficiently clear, but to dissipate the doubts of outsiders.

The resolution and draft regulations for the plebiscite, proposed by the Department, were adopted by the Storting on July 28.2 The Department's recommendation may be summarized as follows: The elections were to take place throughout the Kingdom on Sunday, August 13, at 1 P. M. The electoral qualifications fixed on the last election of the Storting were to be followed except with certain modifications,— chiefly calculated to allow those to vote who had attained their majority or completed the necessary period of domicile since the last election. In view of the shortness of the time certain 1 Documents, post, p. 1051.

2 Documents, post, pp. 1053 et seq.

3 The electoral qualifications in Norway in 1905 allowed all male citizens over 25 to

« ZurückWeiter »