Ocean, of one hundred and twenty guns, under repair at that port, was to have been finished by torch-light, to assist in conveying eighteen thousand men; three thousand of which were to be cavalry, artillery, and engineers. Sailing from Brest they were to steer well to the westward of Ireland, and then turning suddenly to the east, enter Loch Swilly, as if coming from Newfoundland. Thirty-six hours after having anchored, they were to sail again, leaving the brigs and all the transports, with the Voluntaire frigate, whose guns were to serve for the army, or to be placed in battery, or otherwise, as might be most advisable. The landing in Ireland, if not immediately effected, was to have been abandoned; no time was to be lost, and the squadron was to steer for Cherbourg, to gain intelligence of the army at Boulogne, and escort the flotilla. If, on reaching this last place, the Admiral should find the winds so unfavourable as to force him to pass the Straits of Dover, he was to proceed to the Texel, where he would find seven Dutch ships of the line, and twentyseven thousand men embarked: these he was to take under his convoy, and proceed with them to Ireland. "One or the other of these operations," says Napoleon, "must succeed;" and then, whether he had thirty or forty thousand men in Ireland, whether he was himself in England or Ireland, the victory was his. “Le gain de la guerre est a nous." "The English attacked at the same time in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, unaccustomed to

such visitations, will be made sensible of their own weakness." Napoleon supposed, and with great reason, that as soon as Admiral Cornwallis heard of the sailing of Gantheaume from Brest, he would steer for Ireland, and not finding him there, that he would return to Brest and watch for him. For this reason Gantheaume was directed, after landing his troops, to go round the north of Scotland, and repair to the Texel: at the time of his departure from Brest, a hundred and twenty thousand men would be embarked at Boulogne, and twenty-five thousand at the Texel. These were to continue embarked as long as the expedition to Ireland lasted. The sailing of the Toulon and Rochefort divisions was to precede that of Brest for Ireland, as it was calculated that the twenty sail of the line, of which those squadrons were composed, would oblige us to send thirty sail in pursuit of them; and the ten or twelve thousand troops on board of them would cause us also to send strong reinforcements to our vulnerable points.

In consequence of our seizure of the Spanish frigates in October, 1804, the king of Spain was very easily induced to join Napoleon in his hostility to England. A force of thirty sail of the line in the ports of the Peninsula, with six months' provisions, and five thousand troops, would appear formidable in a French or English newspaper, but no where else. We have seen the Spanish line of battle ships twenty-four hours unmooring; as many minutes are sufficient for a well

manned British ship to perform the same operation. When on any grand ceremony, they found it necessary to cross their top-gallant yards in harbour, they began the day before; we cross ours in one minute from the deck. But, as enemies, the Spaniards have rarely deserved our notice. Gravina took the command of the Spanish fleet at Cadiz; Grandelana, the squadron at Ferrol. Gibraltar was threatened by a Spanish army encamped at St. Roch, under the command of Valdez; while O'Farril had another of twenty-five thousand men on the frontiers of Portugal, to command the equivocal neutrality of that power.

There is an inextricable confusion and want of arrangement in the plans of Napoleon, and one is led to suppose that he wished to put England on her guard against his enterprise, merely to furnish him with excuses for not undertaking it. It is clear, that if he seriously meditated the invasion of England, he began his work in a manner of all others the least likely to ensure success. He had so long threatened it, that he felt his honour was concerned in the execution: yet when the season approached, he was evidently afraid to embark his fortune as a soldier, his crown, and his life, on an element which fatal experience had often told him was not favourable to the genius of France.

Why did he not, when his forces in the spring of 1805 were perfectly prepared, assemble them all in the Channel? Hisfleet from Toulon, which he

intended should coast along the shores of Europe, and gather the squadrons, till they united at Brest with a fleet of eighty sail of the line, never made the attempt beyond raising the blockade of Cadiz. What was the capture or pillage of a poor little island in the West Indies, compared to the mighty plans of which he had so loudly boasted? Was it likely that his fleet, after a campaign in that pestilential climate, would have been better prepared for the execution of his project, than they were at their first sailing out of port? Where was the probability that his scattered squadrons (admitting their escape from our pursuit) would join the appointed rendezvous at Boulogne, after a cruise of six months, when so many events, of which his admirals must have been ignorant, might in their absence have changed the whole face of Europe? Napoleon, who had led his legions to the water-side, trembled at the sight of that shore, the possession of which had been the object of his fondest hopes, the height of his ambition. Having advanced so far, he knew not how to retreat with honour, and was, no doubt, happy to hear that Villeneuve had returned to Ferrol; and thus after venting his peevish expression, Quel Amiral!" he gladly availed himself of the non-appearance of his fleet, which he pretended had rendered the undertaking impracticable. The armaments, which he had sent to different parts of the world, returned without effecting any thing, if we except the plunder of Rousseau, by Missiessy and General

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La Grange. Napoleon, affecting disappointment, turned away from the ocean, and led his army to the plains of Jena and Austerlitz. Missiessy, a gallant and enterprising officer, whether enjoined to return quickly, or not supposing himself strong enough, made no systematic attack to reduce Dominica, and was forced to be contented with a predatory warfare. Villeneuve, anxious to avoid the victorious Nelson, fled through the West Indies, and had almost reached his port, when intercepted and brought to action by the brave Sir Robert Calder.

Early in March, Sir Robert was on his station, near Cape Prior, with only seven sail of the line, soon after augmented to nine: nor was it till the 14th of July that he was reinforced by the junction of Rear-admiral Stirling, with six sail of the line, who came to him from Rochefort, which port he had been blockading, and where it has been observed the enemy had five sail of the line, which sailed immediately on his quitting that station. For five months, with the most immoveable patience, had Sir Robert Calder, with a very inferior force, watched the port of Ferrol, where the enemy had five sail of French ships of the line, as many Spanish, and eight frigates, ready for sea, besides three more Spanish ships of the line in a very forward state of equipment.

The return of Villeneuve to some port in Europe was to be daily expected. Brest and Cadiz were guarded, and Sir Robert Calder was ordered to