he found, in every part of the treaty, so much ambiguity and concession, so much variance from the established practice, that he felt himself obliged to deliver his opinion, in hopes, even yet, before it came to be the definitive law for the government of our navigation and marine, that it might be modified and rendered more consonant with our ancient claims, our invariable practice, our national dignity, and our maritime power.

The treaty was defended by the Lord Chancellor; who said, that he had himself been a party consenting to its adoption. The settlement, his Lordship said, had been obtaired on a great and liberal basis, which shewed to the world that Great Britain was not intolerant in her power. The points we had gained were that free bottoms did not make free goods; that ships of war had the right of search; that the blockade of ports should be recognized as legitimate; that the exercise of those rights should be regulated by clear, intelligible, and liberal rules; and what was of more consequence than all, that any casual violation of these rules should not be a ground of quarrel, but should be determined by the tribunals of the country. He considered that the wording of the treaty was sufficiently explicit to prevent the neutrals from carrying on either the coasting, or colonial trade of the enemy. France had at one time during the war, broached the monstrous doctrine, that they had a right to seize and confiscate the property of neutrals, if of British produce. This treaty went

on a different principle, and declared, that Great Britain would not consider as enemy's property, such goods, as having formerly belonged to the enemy, had since become the property of neutrals. Although we, therefore, permitted the neutrals to acquire the colonial productions of an enemy, we did not permit them to carry on the colonial trade. This was a treaty, his Lordship said, concluded with Russia separately, and it was not to be supposed, that all the other neutral nations were to come under this arrangement. Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and America, were no parties to it.

Lord Grenville explained; he did not mean that the article with respect to "contraband of war," which was introduced into this treaty with Russia, would be extended to Sweden and Denmark, but he meant that in this treaty it should be put out of all doubt, that England generally considers naval stores as contraband of war. Holland and America might again suppose from the wording of this treaty, that by the law of nations on which they stood, naval stores were not contraband of war.

Lord Mulgrave supported the address, but differed from most of the noble lords who had spoken, in several points: he differed from the Lord Chancellor, who called it one of the most advantageous treaties this country had ever made; nor could he agree with Lord Holland, who had treated lightly the five different heads enumerated by Lord Grenville, as the principles which caused the contest with the northern powers; he thought those prin

ciples were rights of the utmost importance to this country, as a maritime nation. He considered that these rights were not secured to this country, as fully as might have been wished, but yet that a great deal had been obtained, and a great many claims, hostile to this country, had been abandoned by the northern powers: under this impression he voted for the address.

Lord Nelson, the hero of the Nile and Copenhagen, approved of the treaty, because it put an end to that principle, that free bottoms made free goods, a proposition so injurious to the maritime rights of this country, that sooner than concede it, we should wage war to the last drop of British blood.

There is one part of his Lordship's speech, which has either been improperly taken down by the reporters, or we confess we do not understand it his Lordship is made to say, "As to our not classing naval-stores as contraband of war in our separate treaty with Russia, he saw no danger in the omission; Russia neither supplied those naval stores, nor had she ships to convey them." To this we reply, that Memel and Riga have for many years supplied us with masts, hemp, tallow, and hides ; our iron, pitch, and tar, we get from Sweden; Norway supplies deals, and hand-masts, as we call them; from Dantzic we get plank, &c. We cannot, therefore, comprehend the meaning of the assertion of Nelson, who during an eventful period had held the command of the Baltic fleet.

The neutral merchant, previously to placing his vessel under convoy, was expected to produce the most accurate proofs of the nature of his cargo, and the purpose of his voyage; and should it so happen that "a ship of war having a merchant-ship, or ships, under convoy, shall meet with a ship of war, of either contracting party who shall then be in a state of war, in order to avoid all disorder, they shall keep out of cannot-shot." The whole of this third article seems to be so complex and contradictory, that the duty of the captain becomes more arduous and difficult, and an appeal to the cannon more probable than before, inasmuch as two officers, "jealous of honour," are set to decipher papers written in a language which it is most probable, one or the other could not understand; and which, with a carelessness or design, not unusual in legal and diplomatic forms, are left to bear such construction as may best suit the views of either party.

The fifth article prohibits any ship of war resisting by force the detention of one of his convoy; and lays heavy responsibility on the captain detaining without sufficient cause. Of this we have long been aware; and some of our naval officers know, by sad experience, that the detention of a neutral is often fatal to their fortunes. A A powerful maritime nation will never concede to its enemy a supply of naval-stores; and as the articles are the staple of the north of Europe, we may expect a renewal of these disputes at no very dis

tant period; the same causes ever producing the same effects. Under the numerous provisions of this treaty, the duties of the blockade crowd upon us with an importunity, which baffles the powers of the most efficient and active marine.

The laws of war are, after all, the law of the strongest. When Britain has no longer the power to do herself justice, she may seek it in vain, from the magnanimity of her friends, or her enemies.

It appears impossible that human wisdom should devise a code of laws, to which all the nations of Europe should submit. Interests varying with times and circumstances, and combined with arbitrary power, overthrow the wisest institutions; and the weak will look in vain for justice from the powerful. Still we see no reason to suppose, that by this treaty, the neutral is permitted to carry on the colonial trade of the enemy: our own experience in the latter part of the war, proves that no such indulgence was intended, although the proposition had its supporters both in and out of parliament. From the year 1807 to 1812, the Americans and other neutrals suffered most severely, for their adventurous speculations in this branch of commerce.

There was an important note from Lord St. Helens to Lord Hawkesbury, which might have gratified the pride, and quieted the fears, of the most scrupulous supporters of the honour of their country; proving the infallible efficacy of the