The Virtues of Happiness: A Theory of the Good LifeOxford University Press, 2014 - 253 Seiten As children we learn life is unfair: bad things happen to good people and good things happen to bad people. So, it is natural to ask, "Why play fairly in an unfair world? If being immoral will get you what you want and you know you can't get caught, why not do it?" The answers, as argued herein, begin with the idea that morality and happiness are not in competition. If this is so, then we can see how immorality undermines its perpetrator's happiness: self-respect is necessary for happiness, and immorality undermines self-respect. As we see how our self-respect is conditional upon how we respect others, we learn to evaluate and value ourselves, and others, appropriately. The central thesis is the result of combining the ancient Greek conception of happiness (eudaimonia) with a modern conception of self-respect. We become happy, we life the best life we can, only by becoming virtuous: by being as courageous, fair, temperate, and wise as can be. These are the virtues of happiness. This book explains why it is bad to be bad and good to be good, and what happens to people's values as their practical rationality develops. |
Inhalt
Introduction | 1 |
Chapter 1 Getting Our Bearings | 9 |
Chapter 2 Becoming Good | 92 |
Chapter 3 Why Its Good to Be Good | 153 |
Bibliography | 233 |
| 245 | |
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agree akrasia answer argument Aristotle Baltes become behavior beloved better chapter character traits cheating choose claim conception of morality courage course discussed disrespect dualism egoists eudaimonia evaluative example fact false fear feel Foscos goal haecceities harm Hartrights hedonism Herbert Freeman Hursthouse idea immorality impartial implies important insofar instrumental value intrinsic judgments justice justified least live metaethical mistakes moralists morality and self-interest motivated noninstrumental value normative objectively one’s oneself other-regarding considerations ourselves paradox of happiness partial passion perhaps perpetrator person philosophers phronesis Plato pleasure practical rationality problem properties psychology question re-evaluation reason recognition respect requires right thing Rosalind Hursthouse sacrifice sake self-deception self-disrespecting self-knowledge self-regarding self-respect sense servile Sidgwick Simon Blackburn situation social conception sort Stoics teleology temperance thought Thrasymachus tion treat truly understand valuable Virtue Ethics virtue theory virtuous wisdom wise wrong Xena Yves Yvonne