Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective ActionCambridge University Press, 30.11.1990 - 280 Seiten Congratulations to Elinor Ostrom, Co-Winner of The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009! The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries. |
Inhalt
CHAPTER 2 | 29 |
Interdependence independent action and collective action | 38 |
Framing inquiry | 45 |
Studying institutions in field settings | 55 |
Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests | 61 |
Huerta irrigation institutions | 69 |
Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines | 82 |
Similarities among enduring selfgoverning CPR institutions | 88 |
A Sri Lankan fishery | 149 |
Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka | 157 |
The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries | 173 |
CHAPTER 6 | 182 |
A framework for analyzing institutional choice | 192 |
A challenge to scholarship in the social sciences | 214 |
245 | |
256 | |
The entrepreneurship game | 127 |
The polycentric publicenterprise game | 133 |
CHAPTER 5 | 143 |
271 | |
278 | |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2015 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
able achieve action activities affect agency agreement analysis appropriators arrangements associations authorities behavior benefits California canal Central Central Basin Chapter choice collective commons complex continue cooperation costs court decisions dependent described developed discussion district economic efforts enforcement example exist expected external face farmers field fishers fishing Further future given groundwater important included increase individuals initial institutions internal involved irrigation land limited located major models monitoring needed nets norms obtain occur officials operational organize Ostrom outcomes participants particular political position possible presented Press principles problems producers proposed pumping regulation replenishment resource result rules share similar situation solve strategies structure substantial supply theory tion transformation units University variables village West Basin
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