Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective ActionCongratulations to Elinor Ostrom, Co-Winner of The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009! The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries. |
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LibraryThing Review
Nutzerbericht - misterO - LibraryThingI am surprised that there’s little review activity going on for this book, even though the author has won the “fake nobel” prize (i.e. the “price in memory of alfred nobel” for economy). Regardless of ... Vollständige Rezension lesen
Inhalt
CHAPTER 2 | 29 |
Interdependence independent action and collective action | 38 |
Studying institutions in field settings | 55 |
Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests | 61 |
Huerta irrigation institutions | 69 |
Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines | 82 |
Similarities among enduring selfgoverning CPR institutions | 88 |
CHAPTER 4 | 103 |
CHAPTER 5 | 143 |
A Sri Lankan fishery | 149 |
Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka | 157 |
The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries | 173 |
CHAPTER 6 | 182 |
A framework for analyzing institutional choice | 192 |
A challenge to scholarship in the social sciences | 214 |
245 | |
The litigation game | 111 |
The entrepreneurship game | 127 |
The polycentric publicenterprise game | 133 |
271 | |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2015 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
able achieve action activities affect agency agreement analysis appropriators arrangements assigned associations authorities behavior benefits California canal Central Basin Chapter choice collective commons complex continue cooperative costs court decisions dependent described developed dilemma discussed district economic efforts enforcement example exist expected external face farmers field fishers fishing follow Further future given groundwater important incentives included increase individuals initial institutions interests internal involved irrigation land limited located major models monitoring needed nets obtain occur officials operational organize Orihuela outcomes participants particular political position possible present principles problems producers pumping regulation resource resource units result rules share similar situation solve strategies structure studies substantial supply theory tion variables village West Basin zanjera
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Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'new Institutionalism' B. Guy Peters Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2005 |