Game Theory and the LawHarvard University Press, 1998 - 330 Seiten This book is the first to apply the tools of game theory and information economics to advance our understanding of how laws work. Organized around the major solution concepts of game theory, it shows how such well known games as the prisoner’s dilemma, the battle of the sexes, beer-quiche, and the Rubinstein bargaining game can illuminate many different kinds of legal problems. Game Theory and the Law highlights the basic mechanisms at work and lays out a natural progression in the sophistication of the game concepts and legal problems considered. |
Inhalt
Bibliographic Notes | 4 |
Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game | 50 |
Information Revelation Disclosure Laws and Renegotiation | 79 |
Signaling Screening and Nonverifiable Information | 122 |
Reputation and Repeated Games | 159 |
Collective Action Embedded Games and the Limits | 188 |
Noncooperative Bargaining | 219 |
Bargaining and Information | 244 |
Information and the Limits of | 268 |
Notes | 275 |
References | 289 |
Glossary | 301 |
| 319 | |
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Game Theory and the Law Douglas G. Baird,Robert H. Gertner,Randal C. Picker Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 1998 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
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